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USES AND MISUSES OF HISTORY IN THE DEBATE OVER
IMMIGRATION REFORM
By Otis L. Graham, Jr.
In no other realm of our national life are
we so hampered and stultified by the dead
hand of the past as we are in this field
of immigration.
-Harry S. Truman
The seat of the mind is in memory.
-Saint Augustine
The United States entered a new era of large-scale immigration in the late
1960s, and in response to mounting public concern, Congress debated and almost passed
a major immigration reform measure between 1981 and 1984. The Immigration Reform and
Control Act (henceforth, Simpson-Mazzoli) expired at the very beginning of the 98th
Congress after agonizing and laborious months of hearings and legislative maneuvers.
Though Senator Alan Simpson doggedly introduced a different measure in early 1985 for
its uncertain run against the odds, it aimed at illegal immigration, leaving the legal
variety for another day. It may be said that the Simpson-Mazzoli reform bill of the
early 1980s is now a very interesting piece of what students sometimes call "past
history."1
What advisers did the politicians call upon as they contemplated a policy
response to new immigration circumstances? Reviewing the long policy debate, which
actually began with an executive branch task force study in the Ford administration
and carried through the Hesburgh Commission to the extensive hearings on Simpson-
Mazzoli, one finds Congress taking counsel from government bureaucrats drawn from the
law enforcement, social welfare, and foreign policy fields; from academic demographers
and economists; and, overwhelmingly, as always, from the self-selected representatives
of interest groups who have a special concern with the topic. In this case, the latter
were spokesmen from agri-business, labor unions, Mexican-American organizations, the
immigration bar, church and philanthropic organizations, Chambers of Commerce, and any
stray public interest group from population or conservation perspectives who wished to
advise if not consent. This was proper, and traditional. The subject of immigration
touches many aspects of human life, and requires illumination from many disciplines
and social perspectives. But as one separated the subject matter into time dimensions
- into references to what is past, to what is present, to what will be in the future -
it would be my estimate that reference to things in the past at least matched in
frequency mention of current situations, and easily exceeded references to the future.
What happened in the past was much alluded to by congressmen and senators, and
economists, lawyers, and other expert witnesses made judgments about history. The past
was abundantly engaged, but professional historians were virtually absent.
This, too, is traditional. Historians have not much noticed and almost never
protested our absence from the more formal realms of policy-making. Yet our subject
matter, not in the sense of ownership but of life-long professional engagement, is
amply and invariably present there. History is much used in the form of its "lessons."
The case under study enlarges a general finding - that such uses are most often
painful misuses.
In this essay I shall attempt to demonstrate how this was so, and to suggest
remedies. The latter is no simple task. If history is mis-used, should professional
historians strive for a form of historic preservation, by demanding that policymakers
remove their presentist hands from the body of Clio? Some may be attracted to this
purist stance, but its real impact would be minimal. Another possibility is to accept
the role of critic of the abuses of history in policy discussion. This seems a useful
function, and may be carried out within the policymaking process, when the invitation
to participate is extended, or from the sidelines. It is an important assignment, but
one with a negative cast to it. Might historians also devise and advocate more
positive uses? I shall offer some suggestions as to how we might move in both these
directions, taking as a case study the debate over immigration policy reform.
This cluster of topics deserves a book-length study. Even in so bounded an arena
as the 1981-84 Washington deliberations upon immigration reform, and working only with
official reports and printed congressional testimony while excluding the uncharted
inner hearts of policymakers where history sits as memory, an essay can hardly exhaust
the matter. This essay is a small and imperfect attempt to arrive at a larger
understanding of history's current and potential roles in policymaking.
*   *   *
There is a striking pattern in the many misconceived resorts to past experience
in the immigration policy discussion of 1981-84. Misleading analogies and
extrapolations almost invariably pushed the policy debate in one direction only. If
the two broad poles were to regard current high immigration levels as troubling, or as
no real problem - to favor less immigration, or more - then the past was drawn upon
almost invariably to reinforce the position that immigration is good because it was
formerly a good, and more continues to be better. What is remarkable in the published
debate among policymakers is the almost uncontested assumption that history "taught"
that restrictionist reforms in the 1980s should be defeated.
This is a mis-use of history and a matter to which I shall return. But was it
influential in policymaking? Some have answered in the negative, arguing that
politicians make reference to history only to "provide an aura of intellectual
authority for a position already decided."2 Surely there is some truth in this
assertion, but my experience in immigration discussions suggests that it goes too far.
There are many reasons why Simpson-Mazzoli failed to be enacted by the 97th and 98th
Congresses, and why it took the forms presented to the full Senate (1982, 1983) and
House (1984) as an inadequate piece of legislation falling far short of restoring
national control of immigration to the U.S. A major reason was the nature of our
political and legislative system, which does not deal well with a social problem in
which the public interest and public sentiment point in one direction, while the
interest groups who show up for their part in the dance of legislation prefer the
status quo and play the veto role. This is especially true when the president tends to
shun the issue, as Reagan has done. Many other reasons for the failure to enact reform
might be suggested, and Senator Simpson himself appears to have concluded that this
"comprehensive" strategy was wrong, too many issues splitting a potential consensus.
Convictions and fears had much influence - that employer sanctions might encourage
discrimination, or that certain employers might have to pay higher wages. But analysts
have ignored another major cause both of the measure's failure and also of its
progressive dilution as it went forward, so that by late 1984 it deserved neither the
hopes of its advocates nor the anxieties of its opponents. This factor was history, as
employed.
History was made to be a strong influence for delay, for obscuring the size of
the problem, for obstructing or discrediting avenues of policy which might bring
effective remedy. If explicit references to (let alone the unconscious influence of)
history's lessons had been prohibited entirely, Simpson-Mazzoli would surely have
progressed more quickly and in a more restrictionist version, as national opinion
clearly has desired throughout the debate. A misapplied past has made our national
future more difficult by helping to confuse the policy process.
*   *   *
Let us recall the policy situation. Legal immigration into the U.S. in the
decades between 1924 and 1965 reform acts has fluctuated greatly, but the average
annual total over those years was 191,000.3 Totals in that range made a modest
demographic and economic impact. But change was under way. In the postwar era, the
U.S. became the world's most attractive and open society, a nation with a vibrantly
expanding economy, a growing commitment to cultural and racial pluralism, and minimal
enforcement of immigration laws. Even as the U.S. passed through the Civil Rights
movement and the second full decade of postwar economic prosperity, mankind entered an
era of unprecedented population increase which came mostly in the underdeveloped,
impoverished parts of the globe.
As the human population became rapidly more numerous while yet
disproportionately poor, enhanced global communication and transportation facilities
loosened the ties of locality. The postwar era was thus a time unlike any that
humanity had ever experienced. A burst of global population growth outraced economic
development in many societies of the Third and Fourth Worlds, expanding both human
numbers and human misery. Migration, always a feature of human life and an individual
solution to hardship, quickened in the late 1960s and through succeeding decades. Both
in the Mediterranean region and in this hemisphere, the pattern of movement was from
south to north.
In these circumstances the only First World society with a 2,000 mile border
touching the Third World, the U.S. recorded a surge of migration pressures. These
pressures came to bear upon a nation with an under-funded immigration agency (the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS) attempting now to enforce the new 1965
revision of the basic immigration code. This "most thoughtless of the many acts of the
Great Society," in Theodore White's words, had inadvertently loosened the controls on
refugee admissions and made family reunification the vastly dominant factor in
selection, replacing the occupational focus of earlier law.4
After 1965, U.S. immigration policy selected primarily on the basis of nepotism.
Legal admissions unexpectedly tilted strongly toward Latin America and Asia, and a
surge of nonquota legal immigrants revealed that there was no ceiling on annual
admissions. Legal immigration totals averaged about 440,000 in the 1966-79 period,
reached 800,000 by 1980, then eased back to just below 600,000 annually. Legal
immigration had tripled from the 1921-65 norm. Illegal immigration also greatly
increased, and though it cannot successfully be measured any more than tax evasion,
estimated conservatively it probably ran at totals higher than 500,000 throughout the
1970s and into the 1980s.
Thus arrived a new context for immigration policy. Immigration is no longer an
insignificant element in American life, as it seemed in the four decades following the
1921 restriction. It is now responsible for 40-50 percent of American population
growth, and the proportion will go higher as domestic birth rates remain below
replacement level. Immigration policy has suddenly become population policy, and
dictates an expansion which would have no end if current trends are extrapolated.
Prior to a recent study by Leon Bouvier of the Population Reference Bureau, most
observers accepted Census Bureau projections that the U.S. population will stabilize
around 265 million in twenty to forty years. Bouvier adds the immigration factor. If
we continue to admit 1 million (net) immigrants a year (the current rate is probably
higher), and assuming a total fertility rate of 2.0, the U.S. population will reach
409 million in 100 years, and will still be growing. Yet a 2.0 TFR is below
replacement level! These glimpses of possible futures come after a national population
commission concluded that America would benefit from an early stabilization of
population, a desire shared by most of the public.6
This enormous demographic impact of current immigration levels was the most
important result of the status quo. Since Americans are demographically illiterate,
this was not the impact which most attracted notice. There was rising concern about
the displacement of American workers in a time of unusually high unemployment. But how
much displacement, and where? The matter was complex, but the weight of evidence
disheartening. Illegal aliens were displacing American workers in a broad variety of
desirable jobs, ranging from construction work in Houston to painting the Statue of
Liberty. They, of course, also filled "undesirable" jobs, menial occupations, which
would not be upgraded in wages or status so long as Third-World manpower was
available. The chief victim of the job competition between citizens and illegal aliens
was the American black, caught disproportionately in the bottom third of the labor
market. In the words of David North and Allen LeBel, in a study for the National
Manpower Commission, "large-scale illegal immigration depresses wages, prevents change
in the secondary labor market, and results in the creation of a two-class society."7
These demographic and labor-market impacts were quite clear in their main
outlines. Slightly less clear were the impacts of large-scale immigration on public
sector fiscal prospects. No one doubted that it cost governments much money to admit
refugees on any scale, let alone the large number of recent years. But illegal aliens?
Early studies indicated that they paid more in taxes than they took out in social
benefits. Careful recalculations revealed that illegal aliens represented a moderate
to heavy drain upon public services by the end of the 1970s, as the new residents
learned of their entitlements.8 An Urban Institute study of immigrants in California
found that "state expenditures for public services used by Mexican immigrants have not
been offset by taxes paid by this immigrant group," reversing earlier and less
thorough studies.9
Apart from questions of the demographic impact of current immigration (which was
to make America more populated and add to its demographic momentum), labor-market
impacts (which were to displace at least some American workers and depress wage scales
for others), and fiscal impacts (which were negative and painful for Los Angeles
County but difficult to calculate for the U. S. Treasury), there was the question of
the larger economic impact. Did immigration contribute to economic growth? This was a
historical question as well as a theoretical one. Some argued that large-scale
immigration was a cause of the economic growth we had experienced over three
centuries, and that "there is no reason to believe that what was true in 1880 or 1910
or 1924 has suddenly ceased to be true in 1980."10 This simplistic view was widespread,
but deeper thought carried others to quite different conclusions. Leading scholars
concluded that the economy in the twentieth century - specifically, in the 1920s - had
strengthened when immigration was cut off. Sometimes a national economy needs
immigration of a certain size and type to assist in desirable growth patterns;
sometimes it does not seem to need much immigration at all. But at issue was the
future. No one saw it clearly, yet the U.S. economy was evidently shifting rapidly
away from its old industrial base toward a more capital-intensive, information-and-
service base, constrained increasingly by resource shortages and pollution effects. In
such a future, it was difficult to justify immigration policies which brought largely
unskilled labor to the U.S. in the 1980s and had virtually no tie to labor market
considerations, whatever they might turn out to be.11
Whatever the impacts, immigrants continued to walk, wade, and fly, into the U.S.
in large numbers as the 1970s gave way to the 1980s. The nation's control system
virtually broke down. The INS was swamped by its workload, unable to keep track of
students or other visa recipients, its record-keeping a nightmare, its field
enforcement personnel plainly unequal to the task of border or entrepot control. If
large-scale immigration was a good thing, America was a blessed country; for in the
1970s and 1980s, this was our lot. Immigration now virtually decided the nation's
eventual population total, not domestic birth and death rates. It exerted a major
influence upon racial, ethnic, and religious makeup, languages, social cohesion, the
structure of the economy, and the progress of domestic minority groups.12
With a power to transform the nation which was not matched by many social
developments, immigration, doubling and tripling within legal categories and spilling
over into a major extra-legal phenomenon, could have avoided being seen as a leading
public issue only if its effects were widely perceived as benign. Experts would divide
on this question, but the American public was remarkably undivided. Polls invariably
showed that the public wished less immigration on the legal side, and an end to
illegal entry. A Roper poll of June 1980 found 80 percent of respondents agreeing that
the U.S. should "reduce the...number of legal immigrants who can enter the U.S. each
year," 91 percent of respondents in a 1980 Roper Poll wanted the U.S. "to make an all-
out effort to stop the illegal entry into the U.S. of the...foreigners who don't have
visas," and Gallup polls in 1984 found that 3 in 4 Americans "favor a law that would
prohibit employers from hiring immigrants who have entered the country 'without proper
identification'." The concept of employer sanctions, central to Simpson-Mazzoli, was
favored by 79 percent of Gallup respondents in 1983, while more than six in ten people
said that everyone in the U.S. should be required "to carry an identification card
such as a Social Security card."13
Were such sentiments shared by all racial and ethnic groups? The polls had not
addressed that issue until 1983, and the two organizations claiming to represent
Hispanic interests and sentiment had repeatedly asserted in hearings on immigration
that Hispanics opposed employer sanctions and were not supporters of reforms which
limited either legal or illegal immigration. But surveys in 1983-84 of Hispanics
generally and of Cubans in Miami revealed that substantial majorities of both
Hispanics and blacks favored penalties on employers hiring illegal aliens and
increased funding for the Border Patrol, while believing that illegal aliens take jobs
from American workers. Asked if immigration laws should be tougher, 70 percent of
blacks and 55 percent of Hispanic citizens agreed, according to a pioneering poll
taken by V. Lance Torrance and Peter Hart in 1983.14
*   *   *
In the 1980s these public sentiments developed into a reform movement and the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill was the legislative result, carrying the hopes of all but the
most uncompromising restrictionists. In the policy discussion surrounding this complex
issue, one would not have expected history to be much involved. The problem of
immigration was a current and a future one, and the central questions were: What were
the numbers? What were the impacts and implications? What should be done? If American
policymaking were a black box of rationality, it might resemble the thinking processes
of Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming. He did not know much about immigration when his
service on the Hesburgh Commission began. He educated himself, and concluded what any
rational person would conclude: legal and illegal immigration had in absolute numbers
reached levels higher than the decades before World War I, and the inflow would
continue far into the twenty-first century unless something were done; the economic
and social implications of such an influx of people were negative to the national
welfare, on balance, so that restriction was imperative.15
This decided, the main outlines of reform were clear, though reasonable people
would differ on the details. Legal immigration must be reconsidered, especially the
absence of any effective ceiling, as well as the desirability of moderating the bias
of the 1965 system toward reuniting families, which had replaced four decades of labor
market primacy in U.S. policy, thus allowing the desires of individuals rather than
national economic interest to shape basic policy. The considerable confusion in
refugee and asylum matters must be addressed. Illegal immigration must be greatly
reduced, through some combination of enforceable employer sanctions, increased INS
staffing, and perhaps overseas developmental and population control assistance.
If democratic opinion were mirrored in legislative outcomes, immigration reform
would have come in the 1980s in the form of steps to reduce overall levels of
immigration, restoring the integrity of the nation's disintegrating system for
limiting and selecting as foreigners pressed for citizenship. The best means to these
ends would, of course, not be nearly so clear. How to enforce an employer sanction
law? Whether and how to offer amnesty? Within legal totals, how to apportion the
claims of national labor needs, individual desires for family reunification on U.S.
soil, humanitarian relief? But the main goal of legislative reform would be clear -
toward policy that was more restrictive and then enforced. To arrive at this
conclusion, one need not resort to the "lessons" of history.     
This was not the result of the 1981-84 battles over Simpson-Mazzoli. What the
policy machinery produced was not what either Simpson or Mazzoli originally intended,
and while this is the norm in American policymaking, the string of compromises had led
to generic difference. Simpson-Mazzoli, if enacted in its last 1984 version. would
have increased legal immigration, and failed to place a ceiling on it, failed to enact
enforceable controls on illegal immigration, and granted a generous amnesty which
would have increased both legal and illegal immigration even above the levels of
1984.16
How to account for this failure of nearly a decade of reform efforts? How did an
effort to control immigration become stripped of virtually all significant
restrictionist features but employer sanctions (not backed by a credible enforcement
process), while taking on expansionist features in the form of a large amnesty, an
experimental guestworker program not confined to agriculture, and enlarged legal
admissions? The answer is complex, and one hopes that a comprehensive legislative
history will be produced soon. Among the factors frustrating reform is a newcomer to
policy literature, an unusual, lifeless culprit - the past, as remembered and
dragooned into service.
There is space for only the briefest sketch of the role to which history was
assigned, working from evidence provided by the official record. The testimony of the
past was repeatedly said to be this: The voices of restrictionism have been heard in
the land before, and the nation should not have listened. What history taught was the
moral illegitimacy and practical obtuseness of the earlier restrictionist movement.
"It is a shameful truth," said one historian, "that historically racism has been the
most potent single force in shaping U.S. immigration policy."17 So much for the
restrictionist impulse, damned out of history. They had all been bigots. They had also
agitated about a non-problem, for another lesson of our past was that immigration did
not bring problems but was an unalloyed benefit. "There has been an underlying
suggestion today that...the numbers are too high, the impact undesirable...." said
Senator Kennedy in 1983. "But as I have said repeatedly...these implications fly in
the face of American history and all that we know about the contribution of immigrants
to our society."18 The economist-turned-historian John Kenneth Galbraith declared: "The
one thing, however, that we know from all historical experience is that the demand for
workers increases with the supply of workers." Immigration always drives an economy
upward; it was natural for Americans thus to interpret history.19
To Father Hesburgh, not only did history teach that immigration had always
helped America and therefore always would ("Enlarged immigration is good for America.
It is part of our heritage") but historians had so informed the Select Commission. As
Hesburgh wrote in the Select Commission's report:
Historians, in their support of increased immigration,
have cautioned against overly restrictionist tenden-
cies. They point out that U.S. citizens have always
been concerned about the arrival of immigrants but
note that immigrants have always made contributions
to U.S. society.20
It is not clear who these "historians" were. But to Hesburgh, "the historians" had
spoken, and had counselled that reform in the 1980s must lead to larger numbers of
legal immigrants.
Beyond the lessons that restrictionism came from morally illegitimate sources
and that immigration always and in all ways was an unalloyed benefit, policymakers
claimed to learn from the past that the meaning of America, its sense of purpose and
of destiny, was not just embodied in but intertwined with and dependent upon large-
scale immigration. "History teaches," said Senator Gary Hart as he worked to expand
the numbers of refugees given asylum, "that many of the Europeans who settled this
continent braved unimaginable hardships...We must continue to serve as the Canaan for
those today who suffer under the same misrule against which our ancestors rebelled.
Each grant of asylum reaffirms this nation's commitment to the fundamental principle
we hold most sacred."21 "Keeping our doors open within reason to the peoples of the
world," said Hesburgh, "is an all-important way to renew and maintain the forces and
values that have made the U.S. the great democracy and world leader that we are....It
is important that this vital inflow continue." To fail to expand immigration in these
days, Father Hesburgh reasoned, "would be a betrayal of what is best in us, what the
country stands for above all else - opportunity, freedom, and respect to
diversity...."22 But my nomination for the most muddled non-sequitur goes to one Donald
Hohl of the U.S. Catholic Conference, who told a Congressional panel in 1982:
We feel it worthy of our time to review the historic
sequences of the changes in our laws and some of the
arguments which were eventually persuasive in accomp-
lishing reform, for today we hear once again the lament
that the new immigration threatens to change the social,
cultural, and even linguistic profile of our society.
The implication is that America as a whole will be a
worse nation for it. After all, wasn't this the judgment
passed by settled groups on each substantial wave of
immigration? Let us learn from the past and not repeat
our errors in the future.23
This translates as: It was a mistake, in the past to restrict immigration. If one
hears suggestions that immigration flows be restricted, they must be similarly
mistaken.
*   *   *
What might historians have said of these many uses of the past in the
legislative history of Simpson-Mazzoli? On this question there is some direct
evidence. Historians, broadly defined as those whose principal occupational pursuit is
the study of the past, appear to have been marginally involved in the study of the
problem and the devising of contemporary solutions. Father Hesburgh affirmed that
"historians...have cautioned against overly restrictionist tendencies," and presumably
concurred in the Hesburgh Commission's decision to enlarge legal immigration totals.
Hesburgh did not identify these "historians," but we know that he valued the
contributions of that craft. He hired Lawrence Fuchs, a scholar with a Ph.D. in
American government, as staff director. Fuchs laudably commissioned several historical
studies for the edification of the commission members, who may or may not have read
them.24 The staff report which accompanied the commission's Final Report opened with a
historical section, and indeed the second word in the Final Report is "history."
Surely this reflects the orientation of Fuchs, and the one staff member with
professional training in history, Susan Forbes. Beyond this point, the profession's
direct involvement dropped close to zero. Of the approximately 175 persons consulting
with the commission as it travelled about the country, I counted only one historian.
This was, however, a great deal of professional advice when one compares it with
the congressional hearings record of 1982-84, where experts and other citizens make
their public contribution to policy. In this voluminous record, I found testimony by
only two historians, one not a historian of immigration at all, and neither invited
qua historian but as a spokesman for interested organizations. If the subject were
acid rain, Congress would invite and presumably respect expert witnesses, and not
issue an open invitation for all citizens to offer testimony because each had
experienced weather. Experiencing weather does not make one an expert on climate;
driving a car does not make one an expert on transportation. But being human made
everyone participating in the immigration debate a specialist in interpreting the
meaning of history on that issue. If Everyman is his own historian, who needs the
professionals?
Some may think it a bit of good luck that we historians are not consulted in
matters of policy, which are after all efforts to peer into and manipulate the future.
Other academic experts, serving as court witnesses or legislative consultants, have
been accustomed to contradicting each other. This has been especially embarrassing,
professionally, to psychologists. More troubling, historians, who are surely the most
tentative and ambiguity-tolerating of all those practicing in or near the broad area
of the social sciences, might become excited by the prospects of secular influence. We
might turn out to be, or learn to be, believers in what might be called the hard-
applied analogy. If those in authority want formulas, Dos and Don'ts, we might be
lured far from our philosophical moorings by the persuasion of influence rather than
ratiocination.
These are real concerns, but those who see merit in our traditional isolation
have surely misjudged the point of innocence. Historians who write in immigration have
already influenced policymakers and the general public, some of whom are surprisingly
literate, and this is true throughout a range of human activities from arms control to
zoos. Most of what people remember was not experienced but taught, transmitted.
Historians are more influential transmitters and teachers than they may think. To
pursue our particular concern, references to the lessons of history on immigration
issues were rarely, in the debate of the early 1980s, based upon memory. The impact of
decades of unlimited non-Asian immigration, the quality of the Dillingham Report, the
furor over the restrictive laws of 1921 and 1924, even something so recent as the
Bracero program - these were influential memories, but almost no policymaker claimed
to have experienced them directly. Interpretation was based upon some hazy
recollection of what was learned from Handlin, or Higham, or some text. Our profession
is already mixed up in the policy game.
How might we improve upon this engagement with policy? I remain dubious about
explicit policy choices coming with the endorsement of "history's lessons," whoever
brings them forward. Most of our advice should bear upon the process of analysis. One
might say that there are at least three stages in the professional historian's advice,
and the first is negative, the admonition to stop thinking in a certain way. The other
two are more positive.
It should first be the historian's task to warn that analogizing is usually a
mis-use of history. Here the layman requires some elementary wisdom. Situations are
never exactly the same. An example of brilliant success or disastrous failure is easy
to lift from the historical record, but this is no substitute for analysis, and is
often harmful. Historians above all others should advise great skepticism about
analogies, and encourage a critical response to their entry into the discussion in the
usual unchallenged way. There is much in the epigram, "One cannot step in the same
river twice." That situations always change is a cliche, but one which explains why so
many of the "lessons of history" deserve a cold eye from those who would shape the
future.
One problem with analogies is that you may have them wrong, especially if
cobbled together out of a layman's memory or distant reading. As a case in point, take
the restrictionist impulse of the 1890s-1920s. It cannot simply be stigmatized as
racist and alarmist, though there was far too much of that. Restrictionism attracted
some of the best minds in America, including many liberal clergymen, spokesmen for
organized labor and the black community, and socialists. The case for restrictionism
had a Leftist heritage as well as Rightist one, which was unsurprising, since the
impact of unlimited immigration fell most heavily upon America's working classes. The
World War I era restrictionist impulse was indeed laced with much xenophobia, yet
drawing an analogy from that time to the 1980s is simply insupportable. The
Immigration Restriction League of the early twentieth century, led intellectually by
racists like Captain John B. Trevor and Madison Grant, was vastly different in
assumptions and argument from the leading restrictionist organization of today, the
Federation for American Immigration Reform. In the 1970s and 1980s, the case for
immigration reform in the direction of stricter enforcement and thus for a restriction
of entering numbers was strong enough to convince two presidential task forces, one
national commission, 80 U.S. senators in 1982 and 76 in 1984, and was made entirely
without the sort of racist or ethnic appeals so prominent fifty years earlier.
A distorted version of history also underlay the interpretation of what
immigration has meant to American society in the decades prior to restriction. History
was said to reveal a simple story, that mass immigration produced unalloyed benefits -
economic growth and creative, law-abiding people like your grandparents and mine.
There is truth in such statements, which are a part of a larger reality. Costs came
with the benefits. Immigration displaced blacks from jobs and entire communities where
they had established a foothold. It sharpened ethnic and racial conflict, and produced
new interest groups whose influences on American foreign policy discussions were not
always helpful in charting the best path ahead. Immigration on a virtually unlimited
scale had skewed income distribution in a regressive direction, and restricting it in
the 1920s permitted a trend the other way.26 The distinguished historian John Higham,
whose seminal Strangers in the Land (1956) told us so much about nativist impulses
which were a part of the motivation for restriction, has written in apparently unread
passages that restrictionism arose also from real grievances having nothing to do with
racial or ethnic dislike.27 The debate over restriction, as Michael Teitelbaum wrote in
Foreign Affairs recently, "is a contest of 'right' versus 'right' and always has
been."28
Even when some episode out of the past is studied with a care and respect for
complexity which policymakers do not appear to think necessary, and even assuming that
one could draw reasonably consensual lessons about what contemporaries should have
done or not done (and not all serious students will agree even on that), an analogy is
a way od transporting dangerous cargo. For times and circumstances change especially
rapidly in modern America. "Our circumstances have changed," one of the two historians
to testify told a bored congressional panel in 1982, "the future is not what it used
to be." The case for restriction does not derive from the past, but becomes stronger
when decoupled from it: "Restrictionism begins with the recognition that immigration
is a solution to human problems which, though it seems to have worked for our
ancestors and for us a very different demographic and ecological time, increasingly
becomes only a temporary solution and only for a very few."29 Michael Teitelbaum of the
Ford Foundation wrote in 1980: "Today...the U.S. situation is unique both in world
terms and in terms of our own history."30
This first assignment of historians who would engage policymaking, to convey
skepticism about analogies, was so taken to heart by a colleague I recently
encountered at a professional meeting that he declared his disinclination to tell
Congress anything at all if they were to ask about his area of specialization (which
happened to be immigration). His expertise was in the issues of another era, he
maintained, far removed from the changed circumstances of today. This seems a prudent
view with which I have some sympathy, but I think it not the last word. Perhaps there
is some use after all for carefully disciplined analogical thinking, an area where we
have much work to do. When some historical episode is close in time, thus shaped by
currents similar to our own, it seems a mistake not to ponder its contemporary
bearing. Take the issue, within the larger Simpson-Mazzoli framework, of "amnesty," or
as some prefer, legalization of illegals already here. Commendably, the European and
Canadian experiences with amnesties were the subject of careful study, and found to
impart a discouraging message to the supporters of this unprecedented (in U.S.
immigration policy) stroke-of-the-pen solution to the presence of illegal aliens. It
appears from the history of recent amnesties abroad that they do not reach the target
population adequately, and have to be repeated. Historical analogies in this case
suggested that Simpson-Mazzoli become a somewhat narrower gate, dropping the idea of
amnesty altogether as unlikely to achieve its ends and objectionable on other grounds.
These "lessons" of experience abroad were ignored, or at least given little weight,
and amnesty was a part of the final Simpson-Mazzoli measure all the way to its 1984
demise.31
The same result obtained in the issue of the guestworker program. Such a
program, either in the form of a controlled work force in agriculture or a foreign
worker contingent which is free to roam the nation for "jobs Americans don't want,"
was often proposed as the debate went on. The Hesburgh Commission paid attention to
European experience with gastarbeiter as well as the Bracero program of the forties
and fifties, and found that the studies produced unambiguous "lessons." As tried in
Europe within the past fifteen years, guestworker programs briefly solved immediate
labor supply shortages, but at a high price in social tensions and service costs from
alien populations which expanded from workers to families and took on permanency. The
host European governments abandoned the programs, and even now strive unsuccessfully
to entice the immigrants to emigrate. Alan Simpson concluded: "The Senate...rejected a
guestworker program....If the European experience is any example - and it is one we
watched closely in our debate and in our hearings - this will result in claims of
equities to justify the workers' right to remain in the country."32
This pondering of relevant history appeared briefly to influence U.S.
policymakers away from the guestworker option. Both the commission and the original
Simpson-Mazzoli drafts rejected the idea. Some witnesses made much of this version of
history. Arnold Torres of LULAC commented: "We look back at the congressional history
of how previous temporary worker programs were developed in the 1920s and the
1940s...the abuses were rampant. We kind of feel as though history is repeating
itself."33 Professor Mark Miller told the Senate that "careful examination of past U.S.
experience with temporary foreign workers policy and of comparative policies in
western Europe reveals an uncanny history of...policy resulting in problems more so
than serving the public interest...."34
Yet here, as in the amnesty issue, historical analogies had little power when
they pointed toward the need for restriction. The historical lessons weighing against
a guestworker program were, as with the amnesty, eventually overridden by other
considerations. On the floor of the Senate, Simpson was forced to accept a guestworker
program. Analogies which appeared to support restriction were somehow ineffective, and
were given little weight. Yet these were the analogies to more recent experience, and
therefore arguably of more policy utility than all of the harking back to the Statue
of Liberty or the "lessons" of 1921. If all analogies may not be banned from policy
discourse, then one hopes that historians will develop skills as critics of the
analogic technique as applied to calculations of what to do about tomorrow.
Thus the immigration policy debate suggests a two-fold assignment for historians
as they confront the layman's favorite substitute for thinking, analogizing. First,
historians must ceaselessly warn against the facile use of past example as a source of
policy formulas. At the same time, those of us who have not thrown up our hands in
despair that analogizing can ever be anything but a source of error (a position toward
which I admit some attraction) must work to clarify and apply guidelines for the
rigorous and cautious appropriation of the "lessons" which past episodes may contain
for similar problems in our present. One prudent guideline might be the suggestion
that analogous situations in the past be searched more eagerly for questions than for
answers.
*   *   *
But disciplining the use of analogies, as vital as it may be, is a form of
policy device which does not, to my mind, reach the historian's full potential. The
most valuable assistance we bring should be analytical, to supply the historical
perspectives special to our craft.
Those who appeal for historical perspective mean many different things by the
phrase. A central meaning conveys the act of pulling far enough away from the
immediate subject and surroundings to see the present in its true form and draw
whatever conclusions derive from that angle of vision. It is often assumed that this
will bring a certain calm amid the alarums of today. This seems to me only one
possible result; on
occasion, that perspective might produce a heightened sense of anxiety! John Kennedy,
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was not calmed by what he had learned from reading
Barbara Tuchman. But there is much more to historical perspective than its capacity to
nurture, by turns, philosophic detachment or a revived awareness of peril.
Let us return to our case. Those steeped in history would place the immigration
issues of today in a long frame of reference, and then might say any number of useful
things to contemporaries. They might remind us that mass migrations cut deep channels,
as migrants relay information and aid along family chains. Immigration thus builds
momentum; current flows will be harder to curb the longer they are uninterrupted, if
one assumes unchanged push-pull dynamics. Or they might comment that newcomers are
always resented by settled residents, usually for a mix of justifiable and mean-
spirited reasons. Or, they might remind others that predictions of economic calamity
in the event of the curtailment of access to a low-wage population have been made many
times by those who use that labor. In the most important of such instances within the
last century - slavery in the South, and child labor in industry - the economy
adjusted nicely to the sudden need to get the work done by others. Or, it might well
be noted that the U.S.-Mexican border has a very different meaning to Mexicans than to
gringos who in the mid-nineteenth century established it far south of its original
position. And I much like the historical perspective offered in this comment on
Simpson-Mazzoli by the historian John Higham, in a letter to the editor of the New
York Times in 1984:
The clamor against the Simpson-Mazzoli bill today closely
resembles the rigid opposition in the first decade of the
twentieth century to any scheme of immigration restriction.
The inescapable need for some rational control over the
volume of immigration in an increasingly crowded world
was plain to see, then as now. But unyielding resistance
from the newer immigrant groups, from business interests
that exploited them, and from the traditionalists who
feared any increase in the powers of government, blocked
all action. The problem was allowed to fester and grow --
until a wave of national hysteria brought into being a
system that was extravagantly protective and demeaningly
racist. Hispanic leaders, chambers of commerce, and civil
libertarians should take note.35
These examples suggest some of the fruits of historical perspective, when by this we
mean the habit of placing the eye where the long sweeps of time cradle the
contemporary event, allowing patterns of similarity and dissimilarity in situation and
context to take on clearer outline.
There is yet another meaning of the term "historical perspective" which seems
even more useful to policymakers. An analytical asset which comes from thinking
historically consists of the application of those characteristic modes of thought
inherent in the historical enterprise at its best. These constitute a special
sensitivity and skill in two dimensions of human life - the dimensions of time and of
context, which might also be called the diachronic and the synchronic, after Robert
Berkhofer's usage, or sequence and setting, even the vertical and the horizontal.36
The first dimension derives from our profession's central preoccupation, change,
and continuity over time. As Lawrence Veysey put it recently, "an overriding concern
for temporality distinguishes the historian from academics of all other persuasions -
except astronomers, earth scientists, and some biologists, who might be called the
historians of nature."37 Where are we in the stream of time? Historians push that
question to the front of the discussion. If we develop skill at anything, it is in the
ability to discern which parts of the received heritage of any contemporary moment
retain or even gain in force and momentum, and which tend toward debility. Every
moment is composed of strands from the past, but these are never of equal vitality.
Reasoning by simple analogy confers on every part of the inherited past the same force
and effect they possessed when they last meshed in some apparently similar situation
long ago. Historians know that time enervates and initiates as it moves, that it
undermines many a fighting faith before that is fully known, and launches new forces
of unsuspected power. As we work with time, we ceaselessly strive to discern where the
hand of heritage is heavy and where light, where time has brought change. We have not
forgotten the words of the Episcopal hymn, "new occasions teach new duties, time makes
ancient good uncouth."
The second dimension derives from the discipline's passion to see things whole.
Economists think that price drives Man, sociologists look to social structure,
philosophers to ideas, political scientists to the State. But historians mesh them
all, adding geography, climate, disease, and the ever-confounding roles of exceptional
individuals and of accident. We may often honor our assignment at contextual
reconstruction in the breach, but our discipline is inherently holistic and nurtures
the contextual perspective.
*   *   *
Where might this lead, in counselling immigration policymakers in the 1980s?
Like economists, six historians might well have given seven answers (along with some
principled abstentions, on the ground that what historians know "does not apply"). But
a certain testimony flows from the analysis to this point. First: Beware analogy. In
immigration matters (and in much else), the pre-World War II past is mostly irrelevant
to present circumstances. Analogies often mislead when seen as a repository of policy
formulas, failed or successful, though they may prove helpful as sources of wisdom and
insight. In any event, analogies drawn from occasions near to our own time are likely
to prove less misleading.
A second communication rings with a more positive spirit, and advises the
donning of the lenses of time and context. This essay has suggested how these
analytical perspectives lead to a clearer perception that the national craft has moved
out upon new waters, requiring a restrictionist resolve in our immigration affairs
which substantially departs from attitudes and practices appropriate to an earlier
time.
"I am not a historian. I wish I were," said Congressman Ron Mazzoli, "because
this subject we are into involves history."38 One understands his wish, for indeed the
subject was saturated with references to the past, and was powerfully shaped by group
memory. Judging only by the rhetoric, the past was much involved in the U.S.
government's decision, in 1981-84, that it would bring a certain set of reform
proposals to a floor vote in the legislature, and then would not change the status quo
at all. Surrounded by emotions and maxims derived out of history, Mazzoli
understandably wished to be a historian in order to sort it all out. Historians were
not ready to be of much help, in the sense that there is no mature literature on the
uses and misuses of history in policymaking. Unguided, Mazzoli and his colleagues did
as they wished with the past.
What are we to make of this instance? We find the past mostly drawn upon, and
apparently most effectively drawn upon, by the opponents of policy change. In the
early 1980s, the past was made to confer legitimacy upon a virtual open door to
migrating peoples, since that had brought us all here and endowed this nation with a
moral superiority denied to more ordinary societies. History laid a moral incubus upon
the very idea of restriction upon free entry, an idea stained by association with
bigoted men alarmed about a non-problem. Historic memories made the American Jew an
instinctive opponent of immigration curbs and gave some Hispanics a deep wariness
about any discussion of a policy area somehow associated with WASP nativism. Thus was
history made to serve as one of the obstacles to a policy revision which was and
remains long overdue.
Have we uncovered a trail toward some general rule, the past tending to lend
itself to conservative (in the sense of preserving the policy status quo) purposes?
Contrary evidence comes readily to mind. Immigration as a policy topic presents
unusual peculiarities. It is not often that a contemporary policy reform bears some
resemblance to a course of action that had "already been tried" sixty years before,
and this earlier reform had come to be remembered (historians were crucially active in
shaping this recollection) as somehow disreputable in motive and some sort of mistake.
And one can quickly call to mind radical departures in public policy for which the
official rationale was essentially historical - Harry Truman's decision to intervene
in Korea, Hitler and Mussolini"s expansionism in the 1930s, even "the Reagan
Revolution" of 1981-198?.
Thus it would not appear that the past is consistently lending itself to a role
as opposer of each and every sharp policy redirection. Yet perhaps the Simpson-Mazzoli
case is indeed a clue to something larger. At least in our own immediate era, and in
domestic policy, the past, as remembered by participants in policymaking broadly
conceived, appears to function as one source of resistance to two sorts of policy
revision in particular. History is effectively deployed against suggestions that the
government undertake a more active social role. This function of the "lessons of the
past" is a recent one. The situation was quite the reverse when John Kennedy came to
the White House, and the pattern will presumably continue to prove unstable. A more
durable pattern may possibly be discerned as one ponders the immigration debate,
suggesting that the past seems also to be called upon frequently and with apparent
effectiveness to impede or discredit policy change which partially or wholly
repudiates and departs from traditional moral assumptions. Amid confusing and changing
circumstances the past seems to lend itself especially well to the needs of those who
resist policy changes involving moral and ethical re-evaluation.
These observations pertain to the history in the heads of the laity. In one
other sense is the influence of history likely to slant, in the contemporary era,
toward resistance to policy change. To the degree that the historical profession
shapes the public mind, or comes to bear more directly upon the policy process itself,
it will be the influence of a profession on the whole suspicious of generalization,
telling a tale of complexity, unpredictability, surprise, contingency, unanticipated
consequences. The currents of this mindset move against many craft - armadas of
foreign or domestic adventurism, to be sure, but also the many smaller, useful
expeditions leaving old policy habitations for newer, more promising ones.
*   *   *
Reform of immigration law toward stricter controls in an important sense
redefines the nation. This is a wrenching and difficult experience, and in an effort
to postpone it, the past has been brought into play to discourage fresh thought and
candid reassessment. History has been given the form of ideology, to make judgment
inflexible. One lesson only from our past seems unambiguous, consensual, and entirely
useful in this immigration matter. It is summed up by Alan Simpson, who came up with
it himself, without help from the experts: "This nation of ours has been historically
and consistently ambivalent about enforcing its immigration laws."39 Amen, Senator, go
to the head of the class.
*   *   *
NOTES
